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I. Moot Court: Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado 
In This Section: 
New Case: 15-606 Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado p. 2 
Synopsis and Questions Presented p. 2 
“SUPREME COURT TO HEAR CASE OF ALLEGED RACIAL BIAS BY JUROR” 
Robert Barnes 
“IS EVIDENCE OF JUROR BIAS IN DELIBERATIONS ADMISSIBLE? SUPREME 
COURT TO DECIDE” 
Shawn S. Ledingham, Jr. 
p. 12  
 
 
               p. 14 
“COURT TO RULE ON CHALLENGE TO JUROR BIAS” 
Lyle Denniston 
p. 16  
“JURY ROOM RACISM IS PROTECTED. IT SHOULDN'T BE” 
Noah Feldman 




Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado 
15-606 
Ruling Below: Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 2015 CO 31 (Colo. 2015) 
Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment. He filed a motion for 
a new trial on the grounds that one of the jurors made racially charged statements. The motion 
was denied, and he appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to forego the rule excluding 
examination into validity of jury verdict, and that said rule did not violate the right to a fair and 
impartial jury. 
Question Presented: Whether a no-impeachment rule constitutionally may bar evidence of 
racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 
 
Miguel Angel PENA–RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner 
v. 
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. 
 
Supreme Court of Colorado 
Decided on May 18, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
CHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the 
Opinion of the Court. 
 
This case involves the interplay between two 
fundamental tenets of the justice system: 
protecting the secrecy of jury deliberations 
and ensuring a defendant's constitutional 
right to an impartial jury. After entry of a 
guilty verdict, defense counsel obtained juror 
affidavits suggesting that one of the jurors 
exhibited racial bias against the defendant 
during deliberations. The trial court refused 
to consider these affidavits, finding that 
Colorado Rule of Evidence (“CRE”) 606(b) 
barred their admission, and the court of 
appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to 
consider whether CRE 606(b) applies to such 





Amendment nevertheless requires their 
admission. 
 
We hold that the affidavits regarding the 
juror's biased statements fall within the broad 
sweep of CRE 606(b) and that they do not 
satisfy the rule's “extraneous prejudicial 
information” exception. We further hold that 
the trial court's application of CRE 606(b) did 
not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury. Accordingly, we 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 




In May 2007, a man made sexual advances 
toward two teenage girls in the bathroom of 
the horse-racing facility where Petitioner 
Miguel Angel Pena–Rodriguez worked. 
Shortly thereafter, the girls identified 
Petitioner as the assailant during a one-on-
one showup. The People subsequently 
charged Petitioner with one count of sexual 
assault on a child—victim less than fifteen; 
one count of unlawful sexual contact—no 
consent; and two counts of harassment—
strike, shove, or kick. After a preliminary 
hearing, the court bound over the first count 
as attempted sexual assault on a child—
victim less than fifteen. 
 
At the start of a three-day trial, the jury venire 
received a written questionnaire, which 
inquired, “Is there anything about you that 
you feel would make it difficult for you to be 
a fair juror in this case?” During voir dire, the 
judge asked the panel, “Do any of you have a 
feeling for or against [Petitioner] or the 
Prosecution?” Later, defense counsel asked 
the venire whether “this is simply not a good 
case for them to be a fair juror.” None of the 
jurors subsequently impaneled answered any 
of these questions so as to reflect racial bias. 
The jury ultimately found Petitioner guilty of 
the latter three counts but failed to reach a 
verdict on the attempted sexual assault 
charge. 
 
Two weeks later, Petitioner filed a motion for 
juror contact information, alleging that 
“some members of the jury used ethnic slurs 
in the course of deliberations.” The trial court 
ordered Petitioner to submit affidavits 
regarding the “ ‘who, what, when, and where’ 
of the allegations of juror misconduct.” 
Petitioner's counsel subsequently filed an 
affidavit averring that, shortly after entry of 
the verdict, two jurors informed her that 
“some of the other jurors expressed a bias 
toward [Petitioner] and the alibi witness 
because they were Hispanic.” The trial court 
then authorized Petitioner's counsel to 
contact these jurors, but only to secure 
affidavits regarding their “best recollection of 
exactly what each ‘biased’ juror stated about 
[Petitioner] and/or the alibi witness.” 
 
Thereafter, Petitioner submitted affidavits 
from jurors M.M. and L.T., both of whom 
alleged that juror H.C. made racially biased 
statements during deliberations. According to 
M.M., H.C. said that “I think he did it because 
he's Mexican and Mexican men take 
whatever they want.” She also stated that 
H.C. “made other statements concerning 
Mexican men being physically controlling of 
women because they have a sense of 
entitlement and think they can ‘do whatever 
they want’ with women.” L.T. stated that 
H.C. “believed that [Petitioner] was guilty 
because in his experience as an ex-law 
enforcement officer, Mexican men had a 
bravado that caused them to believe they 
could do whatever they wanted with 
women.” L.T. further averred that H.C. “said 
that where he used to patrol, nine times out of 
ten Mexican men were guilty of being 
aggressive toward women and young girls.” 
Finally, L.T. stated that H.C. “said that he did 
not think the alibi witness was credible 
because, among other things, he was ‘an 
illegal.’ ” Based on these affidavits, 
Petitioner moved for a new trial. The trial 
court denied the motion, finding that CRE 
606(b) barred any inquiry into H.C.'s alleged 
bias during deliberations. 
 
Petitioner appealed, and a split division of the 
court of appeals affirmed. The majority first 
held that CRE 606(b) controlled the 
admissibility of the jurors' affidavits and that 
the affidavits did not satisfy the rule's 
exceptions. The majority then rejected 
Petitioner's constitutional challenge 
regarding his Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury, holding that Petitioner 
“waived his ability to challenge the verdict on 
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this basis by failing to sufficiently question 
jurors about racial bias in voir dire Writing in 
dissent, Judge Taubman did not disagree with 
the majority's general analysis of CRE 
606(b). He concluded, however, that CRE 
606(b) was unconstitutional as applied. We 
granted certiorari. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
The general applicability of CRE 606(b) is a 
question of law that we review de novo. But 
whether the jury was influenced by 
extraneous prejudicial information is a mixed 
question of law and fact; we accept the trial 
court's findings of fact absent an abuse of 
discretion, but we review the court's legal 




This case requires us to resolve whether CRE 
606(b) bars admission of juror affidavits 
suggesting that a juror made racially biased 
statements during deliberations. To do so, we 
first examine the plain language of the rule 
and its overarching purpose. We then 
conclude that such affidavits indeed 
implicate CRE 606(b) and do not fall within 
the rule's “extraneous prejudicial 
information” exception. Finally, we consider 
whether the rule was unconstitutional as 
applied to Petitioner, and we determine that 
enforcing the rule did not violate his Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury. 
 
A.  CRE 606(b): Language and Purpose 
 
CRE 606(b) is broad in scope: It precludes 
courts from peering beyond the veil that 
shrouds jury deliberations. Specifically, the 
rule provides as follows: 
 
    “Upon an inquiry into the validity 
of a verdict or indictment, a juror may 
not testify as to any matter or 
statement occurring during the course 
of the jury's deliberations or to the 
effect of anything upon his or any 
other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing him to assent to or dissent 
from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning his mental processes in 
connection therewith.” 
 
CRE 606(b). The rule does, however, 
enumerate three narrow exceptions: “[A] 
juror may testify about (1) whether 
extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jurors' attention, 
(2) whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or 
(3) whether there was a mistake in entering 
the verdict onto the verdict form.” Colorado's 
rule is virtually identical to its federal 
counterpart.  
 
CRE 606(b) effectuates three fundamental 
purposes: It “promote[s] finality of verdicts, 
shield[s] verdicts from impeachment, and 
protect[s] jurors from harassment and 
coercion.” Thus, the rule “strongly disfavors 
any juror testimony impeaching a verdict.” 
We have recognized that the federal rule is 
equally forbidding.  
 
With the proscriptive language and purpose 
of CRE 606(b) in mind, we now consider 
whether the rule operates to bar admission of 
the juror affidavits in this case. 
 
B. CRE 606(b) Bars Admission of the 
Jurors' Affidavits 
 
CRE 606(b)'s plain language clearly bars 
admission of the jurors' affidavits in this case. 
Absent narrow exceptions, the rule 
unambiguously prohibits juror testimony “as 
to any matter or statement occurring during 
the course of the jury's deliberations.” Here, 
Petitioner seeks to introduce juror testimony 
precisely to that effect, as the affidavits from 
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both M.M. and L.T. pertain to statements 
made during deliberations. Therefore, CRE 
606(b) precludes their admission. 
 
Petitioner argues that the affidavits do not 
involve “an inquiry into the validity of [the] 
verdict” as contemplated by CRE 606(b). In 
Petitioner's view, the rule only applies to 
statements regarding the jury's actual 
deliberative process—that is, how the jury 
reached its verdict—and not to evidence of a 
particular juror's racial bias. To the extent 
that we can even parse this semantic 
distinction, we deem it immaterial. Petitioner 
seeks to introduce evidence of comments 
made during deliberations in order to nullify 
the verdict and obtain a new trial. Such a 
request necessarily involves an inquiry into 
the verdict's validity, which is the very 
inquiry that CRE 606(b) prevents. 
 
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly 
rejected this exact argument in Warger v. 
Shauers, determining that the rule “does not 
focus on the means by which deliberations 
evidence might be used to invalidate a 
verdict.” Rather, the Court held that the rule 
“simply applies ‘[d]uring an inquiry into the 
validity of the verdict’—that is, during a 
proceeding in which the verdict may be 
rendered invalid.” Although the Court was 
interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), we have 
previously recognized that CRE 606(b) is 
“[s]ubstantially similar to its federal 
counterpart” and that we “look to the federal 
authority for guidance in construing our 
rule.” Thus, Warger forecloses Petitioner's 
argument. 
 
Petitioner next contends that, even if CRE 
606(b) applies, the affidavits satisfy the rule's 
exception for “extraneous prejudicial 
information.” He is mistaken. That exception 
pertains to “legal content and specific factual 
information learned from outside the record 
and relevant to the issues in a case.” But it is 
“generally undisputed” that jurors “may 
apply their general knowledge and everyday 
experience when deciding cases.” Here, H.C. 
did not perform any improper investigation 
into Petitioner's case, nor did he introduce 
evidence from outside the record into the jury 
room. Rather, his alleged racial bias arose 
from his personal beliefs and everyday 
experience. Such bias, however ideologically 
loathsome, is not “extraneous” as 
contemplated by CRE 606(b). 
 
And once again, Warger scuttles Petitioner's 
claim. In that car-crash case, following a 
verdict for the defendant, a juror reported that 
another juror stated during deliberations that 
her daughter had once caused a motor vehicle 
accident and that “if her daughter had been 
sued, it would have ruined her life.” The 
Court held that such information “falls on the 
‘internal’ side of the line: [The juror's] 
daughter's accident may well have informed 
her general views about negligence liability 
for car crashes, but it did not provide either 
her or the rest of the jury with any specific 
knowledge regarding [the] collision.” The 
Court noted that even if the juror's comments 
would have warranted a challenge for cause, 
that did not render them “extraneous,” as 
otherwise “[t]he ‘extraneous' information 
exception would swallow much of the rest of 
Rule 606(b).” The same analysis applies 
here. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the affidavits 
concerning H.C.'s biased statements fall 
within the broad sweep of CRE 606(b) and 
that they do not satisfy the rule's “extraneous 
prejudicial information” exception. We now 
address whether CRE 606(b) was 
unconstitutional as applied in this case. 
 





The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution provides that “the accused shall 
enjoy the right to ... an impartial jury.” The 
question here is whether the trial court's 
application of CRE 606(b), which functioned 
to bar evidence of H.C.'s alleged racial bias 
against Petitioner, violated his Sixth 
Amendment right. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed a 
similar—though not identical—issue in 
Tanner v. United States. In that case, 
following the verdict, a juror contacted 
defense counsel and informed him that 
several jurors had consumed alcohol on lunch 
breaks during the trial and had slept through 
afternoons, while another juror told counsel 
that the jury was “one big party” and that 
numerous jurors used alcohol and drugs. 
After holding that Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) 
barred this testimony, the Court considered 
whether the Sixth Amendment nevertheless 
required the trial court to examine such 
evidence. The Court first declared that “long-
recognized and very substantial concerns 
support the protection of jury deliberations 
from intrusive inquiry.” Turning to the 
opposing scale, the Court reasoned that 
“several aspects of the trial process” protect a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury. The Court identified four 
specific safeguards: (1) voir dire; (2) the 
court and counsel's ability to observe the jury 
during trial; (3) jurors' opportunity to “report 
inappropriate juror behavior to the court 
before they render a verdict”; and (4) the 
opportunity to use non-juror evidence of 
misconduct to impeach the verdict following 
trial. Id. The Court thus concluded that Rule 
606(b) need not yield to Sixth Amendment 
considerations. 
 
Tanner, then, held that Rule 606(b) was not 
unconstitutional as applied to cases of juror 
incompetence. Last year, the Court in Warger 
extended Tanner to cases of juror bias. 
Relying on Tanner, the Court recognized that 
“[e]ven if jurors lie in voir dire in a way that 
conceals bias, juror impartiality is adequately 
assured by the parties' ability to bring to the 
court's attention any evidence of bias before 
the verdict is rendered, and to employ 
nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is 
rendered.” Therefore, the Court held that 
Tanner foreclosed “any claim that Rule 
606(b) is unconstitutional in circumstances 
such as these.” 
 
Combined, Tanner and Warger stand for a 
simple but crucial principle: Protecting the 
secrecy of jury deliberations is of paramount 
importance in our justice system. It was this 
principle that animated the Court's refusals to 
deem Rule 606(b) unconstitutional, despite 
concerns regarding juror impropriety. 
Indeed, although the Tanner Court 
acknowledged that “postverdict investigation 
into juror misconduct would in some 
instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts 
reached after irresponsible or improper juror 
behavior,” it warned that “[i]t is not at all 
clear ... that the jury system could survive 
such efforts to perfect it.” As the Court 
recognized, not only would authorizing post-
verdict investigations of jurors “seriously 
disrupt the finality of the process,” but the 
very potential for such investigations would 
shatter public confidence in the fundamental 
notion of trial by jury. In fact, the Court 
perceived such a slippery slope as far back as 
100 years ago: 
 
    “[L]et it once be established that 
verdicts solemnly made and publicly 
returned into court can be attacked 
and set aside on the testimony of 
those who took part in their 
publication and all verdicts could be, 
and many would be, followed by an 
inquiry in the hope of discovering 
something which might invalidate the 
finding. Jurors would be harassed and 
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beset by the defeated party in an effort 
to secure from them evidence of facts 
which might establish misconduct 
sufficient to set aside a verdict. If 
evidence thus secured could be thus 
used, the result would be to make 
what was intended to be a private 
deliberation, the constant subject of 
public investigation; to the 
destruction of all frankness and 
freedom of discussion and 
conference.” 
Turning to the instant case, this case law 
compels the conclusion that CRE 606(b) was 
not unconstitutional as applied to Petitioner. 
A contrary holding would ignore both the 
policy underlying CRE 606(b) and the 
unwavering Supreme Court precedent 
emphasizing the magnitude of that policy. To 
be sure, neither Tanner nor Warger involved 
the exact issue of racial bias. But in 
examining the Court's jurisprudence, we 
cannot discern a dividing line between 
different types of juror bias or misconduct, 
whereby one form of partiality would 
implicate a party's Sixth Amendment right 
while another would not. To draw such a line 
would not only violate the longstanding rule 
of shielding private jury deliberations from 
public view—not to mention incentivize 
post-verdict harassment of jurors—but it 
would also require trial courts to make 
arbitrary judgments that hinge on the severity 
of a particular juror's impropriety or the 
intensity of his bias. We decline to sanction 
such a haphazard process. 
 
Admittedly, bias is less readily visible than 
intoxication, meaning the second Tanner 
protection—the ability of the court to observe 
the jury's behavior during trial—carries less 
force in such cases. But that did not prevent 
the Warger Court from deeming the 
remaining Tanner safeguards sufficient to 
protect a party's constitutional rights, even 
when a biased juror lied during voir dire. The 
same is true here. Other jurors could have 
informed the court or counsel of H.C.'s 
statements prior to delivering the verdict, and 
any non-juror evidence of his bias remained 
admissible post-verdict. That these 
safeguards did not benefit Petitioner in this 
case does not nullify their validity, nor 
Warger's clear endorsement of their ability to 
protect a party's constitutional right to an 
impartial jury. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 
court's application of CRE 606(b) to bar 
admission of the jurors' affidavits did not 




CRE 606(b) operates to ensure that the 
privacy of jury deliberations remains 
sacrosanct. The rule, and the policy it 
buttresses, is squarely on point in this case. 
We thus hold that the jurors' affidavits 
regarding H.C.'s biased statements fall within 
the broad sweep of CRE 606(b) and that they 
do not satisfy the rule's “extraneous 
prejudicial information” exception. We 
further hold that the trial court's application 
of CRE 606(b) did not violate Petitioner's 
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
 
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ dissents, and 
JUSTICE EID and JUSTICE HOOD join 
in the dissent. 
 
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, dissenting. 
 
I agree with the majority that CRE 606(b) 
bars admission of the post-verdict affidavits 
in this case. By its terms, that rule of evidence 
precludes any “inquiry into the validity of a 
verdict” based on juror testimony regarding 
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statements made during jury deliberations, 
and Pena–Rodriguez's motion for a new trial 
“plainly entail[ed] an inquiry into the validity 
of the verdict,” even if it questioned the jury's 
impartiality and not its thought processes. I 
also agree that evidence of a juror's personal 
bias does not qualify as “extraneous 
prejudicial information” for purposes of the 
exception in CRE 606(b)(1). Nevertheless, I 
respectfully dissent because, in my view, 
Rule 606(b) “cannot be applied so inflexibly 
as to bar juror testimony in those rare and 
grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic 
bias during jury deliberations implicate a 
defendant's right to due process and an 
impartial jury.” Racial bias is detestable in 
any context, but in our criminal justice 
system it is especially pernicious. I would 
hold that where, as here, evidence comes to 
light that a juror specifically relied on racial 
bias to find the defendant guilty, CRE 606(b) 
must yield to the defendant's constitutional 
right to an impartial jury. 
 
By foreclosing consideration of the evidence 
of racial bias alleged in this case, the majority 
elevates general policy interests in the 
finality of verdicts and in avoiding the 
potential embarrassment of a juror over the 
defendant's fundamental constitutional right 
to a fair trial. Although the majority believes 
that this result is required to preserve public 
confidence in our jury trial system, in my 
view, it has precisely the opposite effect. 
 
“The right to an impartial jury is guaranteed 
by both the Sixth Amendment, made 
applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and by principles of 
due process.” Our state constitution likewise 
guarantees this right. Indeed, this court has 
observed that “[a]n impartial jury is a 
fundamental element of the constitutional 
right to a fair trial.” Racial discrimination in 
our jury trial system “not only violates our 
Constitution and the laws enacted under it but 
is at war with our basic concepts of a 
democratic society and a representative 
government.” Importantly, the harm caused 
by such discrimination is “ ‘not limited to the 
defendant—there is injury to the jury system, 
to the law as an institution, to the community 
at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected 
in the processes of our courts.’ ”  
 
In its recent discussion of Fed. R. Evid. 
606(b) in Warger, the United States Supreme 
Court observed that certain features built into 
the jury system ordinarily suffice to expose 
juror bias before the jury renders a verdict. 
Warger involved a negligence action arising 
out of a motor vehicle accident. In that case, 
a juror allegedly stated during deliberations 
that her daughter had been at fault in a motor 
vehicle collision in which a man died and that 
if her daughter had been sued, it would have 
ruined her life. Warger argued in a motion for 
a new trial that this statement revealed that 
the juror had lied during voir dire about her 
impartiality and her ability to award 
damages. The Court concluded that Fed. R. 
Evid. 606(b) barred consideration of this 
evidence. It also concluded that its decision 
in Tanner foreclosed Warger's claim that 
Rule 606(b) was unconstitutional as applied 
to the circumstances of that case. In so doing, 
however, the Court expressly acknowledged 
that “[t]here may be cases of juror bias so 
extreme that, almost by definition, the jury 
trial right has been abridged,” and declined to 
consider whether “the usual safeguards are or 
are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the 
[jury] process” under  such circumstances. In 
my view, this is that exceptional case. 
According to the two juror affidavits 
obtained by Pena–Rodriguez's counsel, Juror 
H.C. made several statements during jury 
deliberations indicating that he relied on 





• Pena–Rodriguez “did it because he's 
Mexican and Mexican men take 
whatever they want.” 
 
• Mexican men are physically 
controlling of women because they 
have a sense of entitlement and think 
they can “do whatever they want” 
with women. 
 
• Pena–Rodriguez “was guilty 
because, in [Juror H.C.'s] experience 
as an ex-law enforcement officer, 
Mexican men had a bravado that 
caused them to believe they could do 
whatever they wanted with women.” 
 
• Where Juror H.C. used to patrol, 
“nine times out of ten Mexican men 
were guilty of being aggressive 
toward women and young girls.” 
 
• Pena–Rodriguez's alibi witness was 
not credible because, among other 
things, he was “an illegal.” 
 
In my view, the circumstances of this case 
reveal that the safeguards identified in 
Tanner are not always adequate to protect a 
criminal defendant's constitutional right to an 
impartial jury. Unlike the comment in 
Warger, Juror H.C.'s multiple statements in 
this case evince racial bias toward a criminal 
defendant. And, importantly, these alleged 
statements reveal Juror H.C.'s inability to 
decide impartially the crucial issue in this 
case: whether Pena–Rodriguez committed 
the charged crimes, or whether he instead had 
a credible alibi. 
 
The majority claims to adhere to “the 
unmistakable trend” in United States 
Supreme Court case law “refusing to deem 
Rule 606(b) unconstitutional.” Yet the 
Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged 
the possibility that juror bias may be so 
“extreme” as to call into question the 
adequacy of the usual safeguards to protect 
the integrity of the process. In my view, 
where, as here, it appears that a juror 
specifically relied on racial bias to find the 
defendant guilty, Rule 606(b) must yield to a 
defendant's constitutional right to an 
impartial jury, in that a trial court must be 
afforded the discretion to explore the validity 
of such allegations in the context of a motion 
for a new trial. 
 
The question whether evidence of a juror's 
racial bias should be admissible in some 
cases, notwithstanding Rule 606(b), is hardly 
uncharted territory. In Villar, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
considered whether the usual Tanner 
safeguards suffice to protect a defendant's 
right to an impartial jury where racial or 
ethnic bias is alleged, as opposed to the type 
of juror misconduct at issue in Tanner. In 
Villar, a juror emailed defense counsel 
following the verdict to report that another 
juror said, “I guess we're profiling, but 
[Hispanics] cause all the trouble.” Similarly, 
in Kittle v. United States, a juror wrote to the 
judge post-verdict alleging that some jurors 
felt that “all ‘blacks' are guilty.” Like the 
present case, both Villar and Kittle involved 
racially motivated statements directly tied to 
the defendant's guilt. 
 
In Villar, the First Circuit concluded that “the 
four protections relied on by the Tanner 
Court do not provide adequate safeguards in 
the context of racially and ethnically biased 
comments made during deliberations.” 
Although the Tanner safeguards serve to 
protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial, they focus on juror misconduct. 
In my view, they are not always adequate to 





First, as the majority acknowledges, defense 
attorneys may, for legitimate tactical reasons, 
choose not to question jurors about racial bias 
during voir dire and instead attempt to root 
out prejudice through more generalized 
questioning. And even when defense 
attorneys are willing to probe this sensitive 
topic directly, jurors may be reluctant to 
admit racial bias during voir dire. Second, 
jurors might not report racial comments made 
during deliberations before the verdict 
because they are unwilling to confront their 
fellow jurors, or because they believe they 
cannot report such comments before 
rendering a verdict, or because they are 
unaware that post-verdict testimony is 
putatively inadmissible. Third, observations 
of the jury by counsel and the court during 
trial are generally unlikely to uncover racial 
bias. And fourth, non-jurors cannot report 
racially biased statements made during 
deliberations to which they obviously do not 
have access. For all these reasons, the Tanner 
protections do not always provide adequate 
safeguards of a defendant's right to an 
impartial jury. 
 
In my view, the trial court should have 
discretion in some circumstances to admit 
evidence of racially biased statements made 
during juror deliberations. As the Villar court 
noted, the trial judge will often be in the best 
position to determine whether an inquiry is 
necessary to vindicate a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury. Thus, 
the Villar court remanded that case to the trial 
court to decide whether the juror's report 
warranted further inquiry.  
 
Should the trial court conclude that further 
inquiry is appropriate, it must then determine 
whether a juror was actually biased. If such a 
juror sat on the case, the defendant is entitled 
to a new trial without having to establish that 
the juror's bias affected the verdict. Only if 
the defendant fails to establish that a juror 
was actually biased must he show that the 
“statements so infected the deliberative 
process with racially or ethnically charged 
language or stereotypes that it prejudiced the 
defendant's right to have his guilt decided by 
an impartial jury on the evidence admitted at 
trial.” Therefore, contrary to the People's 
argument, Pena–Rodriguez may be entitled 
to a new trial regardless of the effect of Juror 
H.C.'s comments on the verdict. 
 
The majority admits that Tanner did not 
implicate “the exact issue of racial bias” but 
summarily concludes: “[W]e cannot discern 
a dividing line between different types of 
juror bias or misconduct.” I disagree. I would 
limit our holding in this case to post-verdict 
evidence of racial or ethnic bias that goes 
directly to the issue of the defendant's guilt. 
Racial bias differs from other forms of bias in 
that it compromises institutional legitimacy. 
A holding limited to such circumstances 
would reflect and respond to a real-world 
threat to the integrity of the jury trial right.  
 
Furthermore, the majority overstates its 
concerns about the potential demise of the 
jury system should the allegations in this case 
be admissible in a motion for a new trial. The 
majority reasons that “the secrecy of jury 
deliberations is of paramount importance in 
our justice system,” yet fails to acknowledge 
that jurors are free to discuss deliberations 
publicly. Concerns about “post-verdict 
harassment of jurors,” are similarly 
misplaced: Even commentators critical of 
allowing post-verdict evidence of juror bias 
have observed that the exception in Rule 
606(b)(1) for extraneous information already 
creates an incentive for the losing party to 
contact jurors after a verdict has been 
rendered. The majority's broader fear that the 
jury system may not survive absent 
unbending application of Rule 606(b), has 
proven groundless; the jury system has not 
collapsed in jurisdictions where trial courts 
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have discretion, in rare circumstances, to 
allow post-verdict evidence of racial bias.  
 
The policies of finality and juror privacy that 
underlie CRE 606(b) are well founded. 
Moreover, not every stray comment 
reflecting a racial stereotype warrants a 
hearing. However, this case presents the 
extreme exception contemplated in Warger. 
The multiple comments alleged to have been 
made in this case were heard by other jurors 
and were directly tied to the determination of 
the defendant's guilt. According to the two 
post-verdict affidavits, Juror H.C. expressed 
in various ways that Pena–Rodriguez “did it 
because he's Mexican.” I simply cannot agree 
with the majority that “[p]rotecting the 
secrecy of jury deliberations” is of such 
“paramount importance in our justice 
system,” that it must trump a defendant's 
opportunity to vindicate his fundamental 
constitutional right to an impartial jury 
untainted by the influence of racial bias. In 
my view, to foreclose consideration of the 
allegations presented here is precisely what 
“shatter[s] public confidence in the 
fundamental notion of trial by jury.” 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE EID 





“Supreme Court to hear case of alleged racial bias by juror” 
 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
April 4, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday said it will 
consider a case of alleged racial bias by a 
juror so severe that it may merit breaching the 
confidential nature of jury deliberations. 
In most instances, state and federal laws 
prohibit defendants from challenging a jury’s 
verdict by introducing testimony about 
statements made during deliberations. But 
lawyers for a Colorado man persuaded the 
court to review whether comments made by a 
juror in his case were so discriminatory as to 
violate the defendant’s right to an impartial 
jury. 
A juror in Miguel Angel Peña Rodriguez’s 
sexual assault trial told other jurors that the 
defendant was guilty “because he’s Mexican 
and Mexican men take whatever they want.” 
The juror, identified in court papers as H.C., 
said it was his experience in law enforcement 
that “nine times out of 10 Mexican men were 
guilty of being aggressive toward women and 
young girls.” 
The Supreme Court in 2014 unanimously 
turned aside a lawsuit that sought to 
challenge “no impeachment” rules that bar 
using jury deliberations as evidence in 
seeking a new trial. But in a footnote, Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor noted that case did not 
involve charges of racial discrimination. 
“There may be cases of juror bias so extreme 
that, almost by definition, the jury trial right 
has been abridged,” Sotomayor wrote. “If 
and when such a case arises, the court can 
consider whether the usual safeguards are or 
are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the 
process.” 
Peña Rodriguez, who is represented by 
Jeffrey L. Fisher of the Stanford Law School 
Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, said his 
case presented that opportunity. 
“When racial prejudice infects a jury’s 
decision whether to convict, the integrity of 
the criminal justice system is brought into 
direct question,” Fisher wrote. Groups such 
as the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund filed briefs urging the court 
to take the case. 
Colorado responded that its no-impeachment 
rule had three goals: to promote finality of 
verdicts, shield verdicts from impeachment, 
and protect jurors from harassment and 
coercion. Proper questioning of potential 
jurors before the trial protects against bias, it 
said. 
The case stems from an incident at Arapahoe 
Race Track in 2007. Peña Rodriguez was a 
horse keeper at the track, where three teenage 
sisters went into a restroom. A man entered 
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behind them and asked whether they wanted 
to drink beer and “party.” 
One girl left before the man turned out the 
lights and groped the others. They escaped 
and went to their father, who also worked at 
the track. Eventually they identified Peña 
Rodriguez as the man in the bathroom. 
The jury deliberated for 12 hours and could 
not reach a verdict on a felony count of 
attempted sexual assault. It convicted Peña 
Rodriguez of three misdemeanors: one count 
of unlawful sexual contact and two counts of 
harassment. He was sentenced to probation 


















After the verdict, two jurors went to defense 
attorneys to tell them what juror H.C. had 
allegedly said. Peña Rodriguez tried to use 
the statements to overturn the verdicts, but 
lower courts turned him down. The Colorado 
Supreme Court ruled 4 to 3 that the state’s no-
impeachment rule barred the statements. 
Peña Rodriguez’s petition said that courts 
across the country are divided on the issue 
and that only the Supreme Court could decide 
whether such incidents violate the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury. 
The case, Peña Rodriguez v. Colorado, will 










Shawn S. Ledingham, Jr. 
April 21, 2016 
 
What happens in the jury room, stays in the 
jury room. Except when it doesn’t. Earlier 
this month, the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the appeal of a Colorado man whose counsel 
learned, after the guilty verdict was rendered, 
that one of the jurors had made statements in 
deliberation that the defendant must be guilty 
and his alibi witness could not be trusted, 
because both men were Hispanic. The case, 
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, pits two 
fundamental aspects of jury trials against 
each other: the inadmissibility of evidence 
about what was said or done during jury 
deliberations versus the right to a fair trial by 
unbiased jurors. The Supreme Court’s ruling 
could open up jury verdicts to possible 
challenge when those verdicts appear to be 
the result of racial or other bias. 
Jury Deliberations – Not a Secret, but not 
Admissible 
Strictly speaking, jury deliberations are not 
always secret. In fact, a common feature of 
jury trials in many jurisdictions is the post-
verdict interview, where lawyers seize the 
opportunity to discuss the case directly with 
the recently discharged jurors before they 
leave the courthouse. These interviews can be 
an incredibly valuable tool for trial lawyers. 
They can reveal which arguments resonate 
and which don’t, for appeal and potential 
retrial.  They can serve as a gut check for 
even the most seasoned trial lawyer, and they 
can provide helpful critiques for younger 
lawyers developing their trial presentation 
skills. But, with very limited exceptions, 
statements made by a juror after she has been 
discharged cannot be used as evidence to try 
to upset the verdict. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 606 says that courts 
considering whether to overturn a jury 
verdict may not hear live testimony from a 
juror, nor receive a juror’s affidavit or any 
other evidence of a juror’s statements, on 
anything that was said or done during jury 
deliberations. There are a few exceptions, 
such as when a juror testifies that information 
that was not in evidence was given to the jury 
(like Henry Fonda pulling out the second 
knife in 12 Angry Men) or that there has been 
some sort of improper outside influence used 
against a juror (like the mob’s threat to kill 
Demi Moore’s son in The Juror). But other 
than in very narrow circumstances, it doesn’t 
matter what a juror reports happened during 
deliberations; it can’t be used to overturn the 
verdict. 
Peña-Rodriguez – If Bias Comes out After 
Trial, Can You Do Anything About it? 
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In granting certiorari in Peña-Rodriguez, the 
Supreme Court appears to be entertaining the 
possibility of opening up another exception 
to this evidentiary rule.  Miguel Peña-
Rodriguez was convicted of three 
misdemeanor counts for the alleged sexual 
harassment and groping of two teenage girls 
at a horse track where he worked. The 
defense maintained that the case was one of 
mistaken identity. Somebody had assaulted 
the girls, they argued, but it wasn’t Peña-
Rodriguez because he had been in a barn in a 
different part of the track facility during the 
attack. An alibi witness produced by the 
defense corroborated the defendant’s story. 
After the verdict, Peña-Rodriguez’s lawyer 
was told by two of the jurors that another 
juror allegedly made racist statements during 
deliberations regarding the defendant’s guilt 
and impugning the credibility of his alibi 
witness, including: 
-“I think he did it because he’s 
Mexican and Mexican men take 
whatever they want.” 
-“Mexican men [have] a bravado that 
cause[] them to believe they could do 
whatever they wanted with women.” 
-“[N]ine times out of ten Mexican 
men were guilty of being aggressive 
toward women and young girls.” 
-“[T]he alibi witness [wasn’t] 
credible because, among other things, 
he was an illegal.” 
After defense counsel learned of these 
statements and others like them, the defense 
obtained sworn affidavits from both jurors 
and moved for a new trial. The trial court 
denied the motion, under Colorado’s 
analogue to FRE 606, because the jurors’ 
testimony could not serve as a basis for 
overturning the verdict. This holding was 
affirmed on appeal, ultimately by the 
Colorado Supreme Court. Peña-Rodriguez’s 
lawyers sought review from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, challenging the state 
evidentiary rule under the Sixth Amendment 
(applicable to state law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). The Supreme Court accepted 
cert earlier this month. 
What to Watch for – Balancing of Two 
Fundamental Tenets of Jury Trials 
The Supreme Court must decide whether the 
Constitutional right to an impartial jury 
trumps the exclusionary rule of evidence. At 
issue is the balance between the need for 
finality of jury verdicts, on the one hand, and 
the right to a fair trial, on the other. 
Overlaying this balancing is the additional 
concern — clearly on the minds of the 
Colorado Supreme Court justices when they 
denied Peña‑Rodriguez’s appeal — that the 
lawyers on the losing side of a jury trial might 
harass and coerce jurors in an attempt to drum 
up a basis for overturning the verdict. Of 
course, any ancillary proceeding involving 
evidence from the jury deliberations would 
also presumably require cross-examination 
of the jurors to probe the jurors’ credibility 
and reliability. 
While the Supreme Court’s decision will 
likely focus on the narrow issue of racial 
prejudice in criminal trials, it has the 
potential of shifting this balance more 
broadly and opening up, just a tiny bit more, 
the shroud surrounding the jury room.
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April 4, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday took on a 
long-standing dispute over the privacy of jury 
deliberations, agreeing to decide whether 
jurors can be questioned after a trial is over 
about one of their colleagues’ support for a 
guilty verdict because of the defendant’s 
racial or ethnic identity.  The case of Pena-
Rodriguez v. Colorado will be argued and 
decided in the Court’s next Term, starting in 
October. 
Most states, along with the federal courts, 
have rules that bar the questioning of jurors 
about claims that one of the members of their 
panel engaged in misconduct while the jurors 
were making up their minds.  The idea behind 
such rules is that jurors should be able to 
ponder verdicts without worrying about 
being second-guessed later about the 
decisions they made, and how those were 
made.  The specific question the Justices will 
decide is when the enforcement of that rule 
would interfere with the Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury. 
The case grows out of the prosecution of an 
Aurora, Colo., racetrack worker, Miguel 
Angel Pena-Rodriguez, for alleged sexual 
harassment of two teen-aged girls.  He was 
found guilty of three misdemeanor charges, 
sentenced to two years on probation, and 
required to register as a sex offender.  (A 
native of Mexico, Pena-Rodriguez entered 
the United States as a child; his formal 
immigration status is not clarified in the 
case.) 
After the trial was over, two jurors told 
defense lawyers that one of the jurors had 
made a number of racist comments about 
Mexicans during the jury deliberations.  
Among other points, that juror was said to 
have told colleagues that Pena-Rodriguez had 
committed the crime because he was a 
Mexican “and Mexican men take whatever 
they want,” that Mexican men had “a bravado 
that caused them to believe they could do 
whatever they wanted with women,” and that 
Mexican men were “physically controlling of 
women.”  That juror, a former police officer, 
allegedly made similar comments based on 
his experience with Mexican men.  The same 
juror allegedly described a witness, who also 
was Hispanic, as someone who could not be 
believed because he was “an illegal.” 
Before the trial, the judge had told defense 
lawyers that, sometimes, jurors in the court in 
Colorado often had voiced their dislike of 
individuals who had entered the U.S. 
illegally.  Defense lawyers, however, did not 





In taking the case on to the Supreme Court, 
lawyers for Pena-Rodriguez argued that 
federal and state courts are split on when a 
rule against questioning jurors after a trial 
must be set aside to allow an inquiry into 
claims of alleged racial bias during 
deliberations. 
In its orders on Monday, the Court accepted 
for review only the Pena-Rodriguez case.  In 
other actions, it turned down several new 
cases seeking clarification of whether federal 
courts have the authority to approve a lawsuit 
in the form of a class action if some of those 
involved in the case had not suffered any of 

















These were attempts to get the Court to spell 
out further new limits on class-action 
lawsuits, in the wake of its recent ruling in the 
case of Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo.
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Law and tradition say that a jury verdict 
shouldn't be overturned on the basis of 
something jurors say in their deliberations, no 
matter how ignorant or offensive. 
But what if there’s strong evidence that the 
jury deliberations were racially biased? Does 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial supersede 
the tradition of letting the verdict stand? The 
Supreme Court has agreed to hear this 
fascinating question in a sexual assault case 
where one juror, a former cop, told the others 
that Mexican men "do whatever they want" 
with women. 
Odds are that the court will decide that the 
sanctity of the jury room trumps racial 
fairness – but it’s far from clear that would be 
the right result. 
Most traditions are invented. What’s 
fascinating about the tradition of refusing to 
consider post-trial stories by jurors of their 
own misconduct is that we know exactly 
when it was invented, and by whom. The year 
was 1785 and the inventor was Lord 
Mansfield, generally considered the greatest 
common law judge in English legal history, 
who loved to make up efficient new rules. 
In the case of Vaise v. Delaval, the jurors, 
unable to reach a verdict, had "tossed up" – 
probably a coin -- and agreed to decide the 
case based on the toss. Until then, courts had 
generally considered accounts of juror 
misbehavior. 
Mansfield changed the rule. He argued that 
the jurors shouldn't be permitted to implicate 
themselves in the serious crime of breaking 
their oaths of conduct. If the jury’s 
misconduct were to be considered, he 
concluded, "the Court must derive their 
knowledge from some other source: such as 
from some person having seen the transaction 
through a window, or by some such other 
means." 
The rule probably relied on a then-prevalent 
doctrine that a witness would not be heard to 
allege his own wrongdoing. Today we allow 
testimony against one's own interests, so 
Mansfield’s original rationale doesn’t apply. 
But within a few decades, Mansfield’s rule 
had taken root for a different, more practical 
reason: It assures the finality of verdicts. If 
decisions could be overturned by jurors’ 
testimony about what happened in the jury 
room, the incentive to reopen verdicts would 
be great, and it would be hard to know when, 
exactly, the result would stick.1   
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The Supreme Court relied on the finality 
rationale in a 1915 case. It repeated it in a 
2014 decision, Warger v. Shauers, in which 
it refused to allow post-trial affidavits 
showing that a juror had lied during jury 
selection questioning and told other jurors 
that her daughter had been in a car accident 
and that if she'd been sued, "it would have 
ruined her life." 
Federal evidence law, copied by most states, 
preserves the rule with exceptions for 
extraneous prejudicial information, improper 
outside influence or a mistake on the jury 
form. The extraneous information is usually 
held to include specific facts about the case, 
not jurors’ general knowledge – or their 
personal biases. 
The case that the court will hear now, Pena-
Rodriguez v. Colorado, involved post-trial 
testimony that one juror’s racial bias may 
have affected the verdict. The defendant in 
the case, Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez, was 
charged with sexual assault for accosting two 
girls, one under 15, in the bathroom of a 
horse-racing facility. 
According to more than one juror affidavit, 
one of the jurors, a former law-enforcement 
officer, told the others that the defendant "did 
it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men 
take whatever they want." He made more 
prejudicial statements in the same vein, 
adding that an alibi witness shouldn’t be 
believed because he "was an illegal" -- a 
claim not supported in the trial record. 
The justices of the Colorado Supreme Court 
all agreed that the juror affidavits were 
inadmissible. But while the majority 
considered that the end of the matter, Justice 
Monica Márquez, joined by two others, did 
not. 
Márquez, a respected judge (I went to law 
school with her), dissented to say that the 
Sixth Amendment2  right to a fair trial, as well 
as the guarantee of due process, trumped the 
rule of evidence. She pointed out that in its 
2014 opinion, the Supreme Court said in a 
footnote, "There may be cases of juror bias so 
extreme that, almost by definition, the jury 
trial right has been abridged.” This, said 
Márquez, was exactly such a case. 
The fact that the court took the case suggests 
that it’s at least possible that it thinks 
Márquez may be right. It seems more likely 
that the court will rely on finality once more, 
as it did in 2014. Jurors have all kinds of 
biases, and allowing testimony about them 
could indeed threaten the finality of trials. 
But the court should consider that the federal 
rules already allow exceptions from finality 
for extraneous information. And it should 
keep in mind that the Mansfield rule doesn’t 
rest on very strong internal logic. Given 
these, it makes some sense to treat the 
constitutional interest in a fair trial as 
paramount. Jurors may be biased, but if they 
express overt racism in the jury room, that 
should be admissible as evidence that their 
verdict was unconstitutional. 
